This volume traces the history of animals in philosophy, from antiquity down to contemporary times. Negative attitudes towards animals, as found in Aristotle and Descartes, turn out to be more nuanced than usually supposed, while remarkable discussions of animal welfare appear in late antiquity, India, the Islamic world, and Kant.

in the euthyphro, socrates tells euthyphro that Meletus is taking him to court for impiety.1 Upon hearing Euthyphro’s claim to have knowledge of piety, Socrates asks Euthyphro to take him on as a pupil, so that he might acquire knowledge of piety himself. Although this may seem unsurprising, given Socrates’s high regard for knowledge in other dialogues, the reason that Socrates gives for wishing to acquire knowledge, in this case, is bizarre—for he says it is because knowledge of piety will (...) help him to secure his acquittal on charges of impiety.It is unclear, however, why Socrates believes that his learning what piety is should lead to the impiety charges against him being dropped, yet no one has ever made a.. (shrink)

In book 3 of On Abstinence from Animal Food, Porphyry is traditionally taken to argue that animals are rational and that it is, therefore, unjust to kill them for food. Since the vast majority of scholars endorse this interpretation, I call it ‘the consensus interpretation’. Yet, strangely enough, elsewhere in his corpus Porphyry claims that the non-human animals are irrational. Jonathan Barnes notices this discrepancy and suggests that an appeal to the distinction between specific and non-specific predication can resolve the (...) problem. This paper explains Barnes’ solution, but argues that it must ultimately be rejected. It concludes with a brief survey of other approaches to the problem, and with an outline of the proposed solution, in which the consensus interpretation of On Abstinence is rejected in favour of a dialectical reading of Book 3. Porphyry, this piece suggests, may not have believed that animals were rational after all. (shrink)

In Book 3 of 'On Abstinence from Animal Food', Porphyry is traditionally taken to be arguing in favour of the belief that animals are rational. However, elsewhere in his corpus, he endorses the opposite view, declaring that man differs from other mortal animals because he is rational and they are irrational. Jonathan Barnes offers a way of understanding Porphyry’s logical theory which is intended to make it consistent with the traditional interpretation of 'On Abstinence'. He suggests that the same predicate (...) can be related to different subjects in different ways. Porphyry’s claim that man differs from other mortal animals with respect to the predicate ‘rational’, is best understood to mean that whereas ‘rational’ is specifically predicated of man, it is non-specifically predicated of animals. This explains how they differ from man with respect to this predicate, without failing to be rational. This paper argues that there are reasons for rejecting Barnes’ interpretation. Barnes must maintain, for example, that animals possess the apparently incompatible properties of being specifically irrational and non-specifically rational simultaneously. Since Barnes fails to resolve the conflict, Porphyry’s claims that animals are irrational in his logical works pose a significant problem for the traditional interpretation of 'On Abstinence'. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a proliferation of publications on the status of nonhuman animals in philosophy, some of them single-authored monographs and quite a few others taking the form of anthologies. Anthologies always present the reader with challenges, and in the case of this volume, the challenges are significant. While it is admirable that the editors have brought together essays on a variety of important thinkers and topics related to animals in the history of philosophy, the essays in this volume (...) exhibit a conspicuous tendency to polemical readings of philosophers, as well as a tendency to ignore or pass over very quickly some extremely important work that has been... (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2020, Page 209-212.

This article exposes the sophistry inherent in the construction of the "number line," as this continuum is named by mathematicians, and shows how another continuum, one which preserves the properties of the old "number line" but which is based on rational foundations, namely the relations to one another of the ratios that continuous magnitudes have to one another, can be generated to replace it.

What Science Offers the Humanities examines some of the deep problems facing the study of culture. It focuses on the excesses of postmodernism, but also acknowledges serious problems with postmodernism's harshest critics. In short, Edward Slingerland argues that in order for the humanities to progress, its scholars need to take seriously contributions from the natural sciences - and particular research on human cognition - which demonstrate that any separation of the mind and the body is entirely untenable. The author provides (...) suggestions for how humanists might begin to utilize these scientific discoveries without conceding that science has the last word on morality, religion, art, and literature. Calling into question such deeply entrenched dogmas as the 'blank slate' theory of nature, strong social constructivism, and the ideal of disembodied reason, What Science Offers the Humanities replaces the human-sciences divide with a more integrated approach to the study of culture. (shrink)

When Heidegger's influence was at its zenith in Germany from the early fifties to the early sixties, most serious students of philosophy in that country were deeply steeped in his thought. His students or students of his students filled many if not most of the major chairs in philosophy. A cloud of reputedly Black Forest mysticism veiled the perspective of many of his critics and admirers at home and abroad. Droves of people flocked to hear lectures by him that most (...) could not understand, even on careful reading, much less on one hearing. He loomed so large that Being and Time frequently could not be seen as a highly imaginative, initial approach to a strictly limited set of questions, but was viewed either as an all-embracing first order catastrophy incorporating at once the most feared consequences of Boehme, Kierkegaard, Rilke, and Nietzsche, or as THE ANSWER. But most of that has past. Heidegger's dominance of German philosophy has ceased. One can now brush aside the larger-than-life images of Heidegger, the fears that his language was creating a cult phenomenon, the convictions that only those can understand him who give their lives to his thought. His language is at times unusually difficult, at times simple and beautiful. Some of his insights are obscure and not helpful, others are exciting and clarifying. One no longer expects Heidegger to interpret literature like a literary critic or an academic philologist. (shrink)

There can be no question but that Lachelier exercised great influence over French philosophy. Gabriel Séailles notes it as do others. Boutroux remarked "il fut un excitateur singulièrement puissant des intelligences," and Benrubi places him with Ravaisson in initiating the tradition of spiritualistic positivism in France. Bergson also recognized and acknowledged his debt to Lachelier, although the tradition which Lachelier helped to father was opposed to Bergsonianism in many important respects. The two traditions can, I suggest, be recognized as dialectical (...) opposites of one another. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the understanding of philosophy as entirely made up of argument. It gives some characterization of argument as a rhetorical form and conversation as a motivating attitude. It explicates the understanding of this distinction in Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, and emphasizes the contemporary relevance of the distinction by appeal to the work of Richard Rorty. While respectful of Rorty’s insights, it sides more with the Platonic understanding of philosophical conersation, which does not abandon the pursuit of truth.

It was certainly Kant’s purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason to find a middle ground between Cartesian rationalism and empirical idealism. One of the difficulties in reading the Critique is trying to follow how Kant can maintain his dual argument—that of transcendental idealism and that of empirical realism—at every point. Perhaps there is no better example of this than the crucial argument refuting idealism. The second edition Refutation is drastically reduced from the first edition and as densely packed as (...) any Kantian argument. Our purpose here is to unpack the argument, trying to show Kant’s grounds and his difficulties in attempting a deduction of the empirically real. (shrink)

Introduction §1. 1s PHILOSOPHY FINISHED? Has philosophy now nearly completed its twenty-five hundred years of service to humanity? Has it only a few last remaining tasks of analysis and clarification to perform before its career is ...

As organizational leaders worry about the appalling low percentage of people who feel engaged in their work, academics are trying to understand what causes an increase in engagement. We collected survey data from 231 team members from two organizations. We examined the impact of team members’ emotional intelligence (EI) and their perception of shared personal vision, shared positive mood, and perceived organizational support (POS) on the members’ degree of organizational engagement. We found shared vision, shared mood, and POS have a (...) direct, positive association with engagement. In addition, shared vision and POS interact with EI to positively influence engagement. Besides highlighting the importance of shared personal vision, positive mood, and POS, our study contributes to the emergent understanding of EI by revealing EI’s amplifying effect on shared vision and POS in relation to engagement. We conclude by discussing the research and practical implications of this study. (shrink)